Webinar on Russia and MENA

Underlying Russian interests in the region

The panellists initially addressed Russia’s interests in the region, highlighting goals related to security, economics and business, great power projection, and challenging western hegemony. The Middle East is important for Russian power projection – because it is an area of geo-strategic relevance and an arena for demonstrating its global significance – which in turn is part of its objective to become a global player. However, Russia is not seeking dominance or to replace the US in the region. It was also pointed out that the Arab spring created particular concerns in Russia, in terms of perceived risks of a wider domino effect of regime change, which could ultimately challenge the regime in Moscow: “Existential fear has always coloured Russia’s views of these colour revolutions.”  The goal of domestic stability has also guided Russian actions in the region, given fears that the rise of Islamism in the Middle East could become a threat to Russia itself.

From the perspective of the Middle East and North Africa, it was suggested that Russia offers a system – that of the strong-man, moving away from democratic representation – which some leaders in the region find attractive. Also, there is a perception that Russia can help support states’ domestic and foreign policy goals. Furthermore, many MENA countries, such as Egypt, Syria, and Algeria, had close ties to the Soviet Union, which provide a historical foundation for continued ties today, albeit on very different premises. Several speakers noted that many MENA leaders had received their training in Moscow or the USSR/Warsaw Pact, thus creating lasting bonds. MENA states are also acutely aware – and appreciate – that Russia, in contrast to the United States and certain other western states, is not an “interventionist” state in the sense of seeking to impose its values and system of government, although the engagement in Syria has changed that reputation somewhat.

The return of Russia

All panellists attested to the re-emergence of Russian involvement in the region in the early 2010s, after two decades of absence dating back to the collapse of the Soviet Union: “Since 2010-2011, Russia started re-igniting and rediscovering old relationships.” On the one hand, this reflected anxieties in many key Middle Eastern countries that the US was becoming less reliable and less reliant on Middle Eastern oil. On the other hand, it was also a function of growing Russian interest and capabilities, following its earlier period of weakness.

The growth in Russian influence in the MENA region has been helped by Russia’s ability to speak directly to all the relevant actors, skilfully bridging various regional divides (Sunni-Shia, Israeli-Palestinian, conservative/moderate-radical/religious). Ambassador Sadasivan pointed to how German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2019 sought President Putin’s assistance on the Berlin Conference on Libya. Russia managed to persuade the feuding Libyan parties tocome to Berlin. Another example was when Saudi Arabia forged a deal with Russia to stabilize global oil prices. “Russia is an external actor that cannot be ignored and will be a major player in MENA for the next 15-20 years” said Ambassador Sadasivan.

Ambassador Semneby reminded the audience that the relationship between Russia and the Middle East in fact goes back hundreds of years, starting with Russian rivalry with Turks and Persians. “There have been periods of tactical alliance and rivalry, and the region was the arena for the ‘great game’ with the western powers.”

Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015 was seen as a turning point, both for the course of the war in Syria and for Russian policy more broadly. It represents the most visible example of Russian power projection in the region. According to the speakers, the country’s objectives in Syria included maintaining and sustaining its last Middle Eastern outpost, preventing regime change, balancing Iranian interests, establishing itself as an indispensable part of the post-war settlement, and strengthening its credentials as a peace broker. However, according to Marianna Belenkaya, Moscow is not interested in bearing sole responsibility for reconstruction efforts, and “some in Syria see imperial ambitions from Russia, as it seeks to ‘cash in’ and use it for strategic purposes.” She added that if Russia lost its position in Syria, it would lose its position in the Middle East. For Dr. Morsy, “Syria is another play Russia can make to show it has a seat at the table. Russia won’t leave but seeks to minimize its day-to-day responsibility”.

Great power rivalries and collective security

Ambassador Sadasivan analyzed Russia-MENA relations through the prism of great-power relations. While there have been joint Russian-Chinese actions in the UN Security Council, both countries appear to have different interests on the ground: “Russia is more proactive in military and security issues, and pursues a short term tactical approach, whereas China focuses more on infrastructure and the longer term” .

Russian engagement vis-a-vis Egypt and Iran was also discussed. Recent Russian-Egyptian relations have been characterized by agreements and/or talks regarding the building of a nuclear power plant (to be financed by Russia), the creation of an industrial zone in the Suez Canal, arms sales, and tourism. Given Egyptian dependence on tourism, facilitating the ease of travel for Russian tourists is a key policy goal for Egypt. Russia and Iran currently share certain overlapping interests, especially in Syria, but there is “bad blood historically” and policy differences exist today.

The panellists also touched on the possibilities of a Helsinki-like process of regional de-escalation around the Gulf, with the potential establishment of new collective security arrangements. Marianna Belenkaya explained that Russia was definitely still interested in this concept, which had been presented in July, 2019 by the Russian Foreign Ministry, so as “to project a new view of security in the region”. According to Ambassador Semneby, the Russian proposal centred on narrow military security and would have resulted in the creation of new organizations with the Gulf Countries and major regional actors. Ambassador Sadasivan pointed out that the Gulf countries had been neutral or lukewarm to this idea, as nearly all are happy with the existing US security guarantees. Dr. Morsy underscored the various obstacles that needed to be overcome to create seamless collective security, including differing security needs and the prevalent lack of trust, even among historical allies.

Some advice to Swedish diplomats

Finally, when asked to provide some advice to Swedish diplomats covering the region, all four speakers suggested greater interaction and dialogue between Russia and Sweden/the EU. Marianna Belenkaya said that “Russia is active but realistic”, pointing to its recent hosting of an inter-Palestinian dialogue, and suggested that the Middle East Peace Process could be a good area for cooperation with Sweden and the EU. Ambassador Sadasivan suggested paying attention to the roles played by the MENA region’s three non-Arab states – Turkey, Iran, and Israel – and in particular highlighted Israel’s growing relationship with Russia, which is “flying under the radar”, with frequent visitors to Moscow. This allows Israel to safeguard its interests in the region. The Israel example also shows that that if you don’t have a dialogue with Russia, you cannot explore opportunities for co-operation, and so perhaps Europe should reconsider its approach to Russia, akin to what the Biden Administration has been doing.

In this vein, Dr. Morsy pointed to Germany’s ability to maintain a line of communications with Russia, despite their differences, and to the importance of dialogue, especially for the kind of constructive cooperation on economic development, which the region desperately needs. Ambassador Semneby, too, encouraged the audience to “talk with Russia about the Middle East – it is the only way of finding joint interests and identifying opportunities for bridging diverging interests”, while reminding Swedish diplomats to be aware of relevant actors’ underlying motives in any situations.