Webinar on Turkey and MENA

Turkish interests and the regional rivalry

The panellists initially addressed Turkey’s interests in the region, with Asli Aydintasbas highlighting the discrepancy between how the country is viewed externally and internally. From the outside, the picture is one of a powerful leader, expanding his military footprint around the region, while from an internal perspective Turkey faces a number of challenges: the relationship with the West is shaky, Turkey feels alone in Syria and Libya, the economy is suffering a major downturn, and Erdogan’s popularity is declining. One speaker described an “assertive, resurgent foreign policy”, which seeks to increase the imperial grandeur of Turkey, and reflected an “authoritarian, anti-Kurdish, and anti-western” regime.

The inter-play between Turkey and the MENA region was analysed in terms of two competing axes: one consisting of Turkey, Qatar, and a number of regional, but non-state allies (eg., the Muslim Brotherhood), and the other composed of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE, and their associated non-state actors. Dr. Hellyer described how people have tried to refer to these axes as “the democracy and non-democracy axis”, but underlined that such a dichotomy is not useful, since the UAE and Qatar both supported the uprising in Libya, while both opposed it in Bahrain. He also explained that even with the ongoing, emerging rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey, the axes remain intact, which other speakers agreed with. One speaker elegantly captured the Turkish engagement in the Middle East, comparing it to “moving chairs” and emphasizing the absence of “fixed equations.”

The Syrian refugees and the Kurdish question

The Syrian refugee issue was also addressed in detail. Turkey has become the largest hub for refugees, with nearly four million Syrians in Turkey, a number that is growing due to high birth rates. Bitte Hammargren explained that temporary protection has become permanent, and that the notion of a mass “voluntary return is a fantasy, which will not happen.” The Syrians in Turkey cannot or do not want to return to the so-called “safe zones” in Syria, which are in fact militarized areas. Yet they have no legal status in Turkey, as they cannot seek asylum, obtain citizenship or have residency.

Cengiz Candar pointed out that the Kurdish-Turkish conflict remains very much alive, since the Kurdish issue is the “sticking glue that unites the different strands of Turkish nationalists”. The Erdogan regime is committed to preventing the emergence of Kurdish self-rule in other areas than the one already in place in northern Iraq. No panellist saw any signs of optimism in terms of the Turkish outlook on the Kurdish question.

The economic dimensions of Turkish foreign policy in the MENA region

In addition to the ideological nature of Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis the region, its economic elements, which are reflected in the increase of the Turkish military industrial complex, were also underlined. “Syria was an opportunity for Turkey to expand its military production,” said Mr. Candar, pointing to the increase in Turkish arms exports from USD 250 million in 2002 to USD 3 billion in 2019, and the doubling of the defence budget in the past decade. A key part of this development has been the production and export of military drones, which has allowed Turkey to project power in the region. Economic cooperation with Russia and, in particular, China, has also grown substantially since 2016, with China providing billions of dollars worth of loans to the Turkish government for energy and transport projects.  

The impact of outside actors: the EU and Russia

There was an extensive discussion about whether the EU should pursue a tougher or more conciliatory approach towards Turkey. Several speakers suggested a stronger policy position; one suggested that the EU is currently pursuing a policy of appeasement, as it feels the pressure of the refugee problem and needs Turkey, which is a policy that doesn’t work against this type of regime. In the same vein, Ms. Hammargren emphasized that “the only language Erdogan understands is strength”, and that Europe is actually in a stronger position, given its economic muscle and the limitations in Turkey’s relations with Russia.

Another speaker highlighted the differing policy strands currently being advocated by EU member states: the pragmatic approach championed by Germany, ie “Lets’s deal with him” in a transactional relationship that de-emphasizes human rights; a more rights-based approach; and the French approach, which sees a resurgent Turkey as a strategic threat to EU interests in the western Mediterranean and the Middle East, and thus wishes to curb Turkey. It was suggested that the EU should combine these strategies, in “a smart human rights approach” that simultaneously builds leverage with Turkey and seeks a stable relationship, and which also cooperates with the Biden administration.

The panellists also addressed the Russian-Turkish relationship in the MENA-region. Dr. Hellyer pointed out that the Russian approach can best be understood as following the principle of “where the West leaves, there is a power vacuum that we must fill.” Mr. Candar referred to a grand bargain, where the relationship “will survive in the framework of competitive cooperation”, which brings together two leaders with similar styles of governance. Ms. Aydintasbas highlighted an increasingly uncomfortable relationship, where Ankara no longer sees Russia as an ally but “understands that it needs to tread carefully on territory that Russia claims.”

Libya, Syria and advice moving forward

On the question of Turkey remaining in Libya, the panellists offered differing analyses. One speaker felt that for Turkey’s rapprochement with Egypt to succeed, it could not remain in Libya indefinitely. Other speakers thought that Turkey was more likely to stay on in Libya, pointing to its desire to maintain a strong presence and role in the Eastern Mediterranean. Regarding Turkey’s involvement in Syria, it was suggested that Turkey would remain in the country for the foreseeable future, given its territorial proximity and the desire to prevent further Kurdish territorial consolidation.

Finally, the speakers were asked to provide some advice to Swedish diplomats covering the region. Dr. Hellyer reminded the audience to keep in mind the fundamental rights of the people in the region, and not forget that policies and tactics have a monumental effect on people on the ground. Mr. Candar emphasized that the EU must remain focused on addressing the human rights violations in Turkey, including imprisonments and other violations of freedoms. Ms. Hammargren suggested that the EU should use its leverage and budget effectively, cooperate with the US, and support civil society and municipalities with a progressive approach. Ms. Aydintasbas said that Sweden has a key role in the development of Turkish civil society, and is uniquely qualified to build bridges between American and German approaches to Turkey.