NPT Prep Com 2018

Mr Chair,

Sweden aligns itself with the statement made on behalf of the European Union under this cluster, and would like to add the following national perspectives.

Against the background of a deeply worrying renaissance of nuclear weapons, it is worth recalling that a nuclear weapon’s free world is an overarching goal to which we are all committed. From a Swedish perspective, current security challenges make this task more urgent – not less. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences associated with any use of these weapons are well documented and irrefutable. These aspects constitute conditions that speak in favor of a realistic but ambitious view on the nuclear disarmament that every delegation in this room has committed to.

The NPT proper, together with the agreed final documents from 1995, 2000 and 2010, constitute the platform we need for our efforts. Let us take guidance from these documents, implement what has been agreed on and ensure a successful outcome of the 2020 NPT Review Conference. We must aim to make progress in all three pillars, including a re-affirmation of Article VI. In order to achieve this, we need to look beyond what divides us and focus at the task at hand – finding initiatives that unite.

As a step towards finding, or creating, this common ground, risk reducing measures could take us far. In the current security climate, the risk that nuclear weapons will be used – by accident, miscalculation or design – is increasing. In light of this, we see few things more urgent than the development of risk reduction agenda. Items on such an agenda could include “de-alerting” and “de-mating” measures, avoidance of mixing nuclear and conventional capabilities, addressing cyber threats and re-establishment of diplomatic and military crisis communication channels. Enhanced transparency – be it regarding doctrines or arsenals – should also be part of the package, as should strengthened negative security assurances.

Nuclear disarmament verification could offer additional domains of common ground. In the Swedish experience, verification cooperation is highly meaningful and rewarding. Through the IPNDV and QVNP projects, we have gained a better understanding of the challenges involved and how these can be overcome. This includes effective ways of addressing proliferation concerns. Verification enhances transparency, builds confidence and – by creating the necessary technical capabilities – could facilitate effective and credible implementation of future agreements. Sweden encourages more nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states to engage in this field.

 Sweden welcomes that the agreed limits of the New START were reached by the deadline this February, and strongly encourages the US and Russia to reach an agreement on further reductions beyond 2021. As part of such efforts, a reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, a category entirely outside existing agreements, would be of particular importance. As for the INF, let me underline that its preservation is a key European and global security interest.    

Mr Chair,

Other measures that can and ought to be pursued include negative security assurances. Non-nuclear weapon states have a legitimate interest (right?) in receiving unequivocal and legally binding negative security assurances from nuclear weapon possessing states, building on their unilateral statements in the context of UN Security Council resolution 984 from 1995.

Another key issue is the entry into force of the CTBT. Sweden has a history of deep political and technical support to the CTBT. The norm against testing already established by this treaty is an achievement in itself. However, it cannot be taken for granted. Nor can it ever be fully consolidated without a formal entry-into-force. We reiterate our call on all States which have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex 2, to sign and ratify the treaty.

The ongoing work in the High-Level Expert Preparatory Group is an encouraging step towards a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Let us aim to follow up the work of the expert group – in which Sweden is participating – by concrete action, including the launch of actual negotiations.

Mr Chair,

A well-functioning multilateral disarmament machinery is key to make progress. Some modest but potentially important steps have recently been taken in the CD. Historically, actual negotiations of new legal instruments have often been preceded by exploratory discussions. Let us hope that history repeats itself.   The focus on risk reduction in the just finalized UNDC-session is another welcome development.

As has been reaffirmed by many delegations already, the NPT is the cornerstone for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.  Our priority must be to strengthen the implementation of the treaty in order to uphold and preserve its role as a key multilateral instrument for reinforcing international peace, security and stability.

Thank you!